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RECENT DECISIONS
SILENCE HELD AN ADMISSION OF GUILT.
EVIDENCE CRIMINAL LAW Defendant was arrested and questioned by the police when recently stolen property
was found in his possession. Concerning several of the articles involved, defendant
either offered dubious explanations or admitted his unlawful possession. On appeal from conviction of burglary and grand theft to the Supreme Court of California, it was held: affirmed.' Where recently stolen property is found in the conscious possession of defendant who, upon being questioned by the police, gives a
false explanation regarding his possession or remains silent under circumstances
indicating a consciousness of guilt, an inference of guilt is permitted. People v.
McFarland, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962).
Because possession of recently stolen property is highly incriminating, it is
generally held that proof of such possession by a defendant raises an inference or
presumption that it was he who committed the theft.2 California, however, while
recognizing that such an inference is warranted, has repeatedly held that possession
alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. The prosecution is required to produce corroborating evidence.3 But the corroboration need only be slight.4
Utilized with great success by the prosecution in such cases, as well as in
many others, is the accusatory statement rule. This rule is a result of the legal
maxim, "Qui tacet consentire veditur," or silence gives consent. Thus, where
a statement accusing one of a crime is made in his presence and hearing, and
he does not deny or explain the statement, both the statement and his failure
to deny it are admissible against the defendant in a criminal proceeding as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth. It is thought that an innocent man, accused of a crime, will be quick to deny the accusation and profess his innocence.5
As indicated by the McFarland case, these two rules of evidence prove to be
a most effective combination. While McFarland gave several false explanations
and admitted his unlawful possession as concerns several of the articles he allegedly stole, his convictions as to the others rested solely upon his possession of
recently stolen property and refusal to explain. The particular corroborating evidence employed here, i.e., defendant's silence in the face of police questioning, has
not been favorably accepted by all authorities. It may be questioned on constitutional grounds, its questionable logic, and its effect on police administration.
The constitutional issue is raised by the protection against self-incrimination.
Should refusal to answer police interrogations be treated in the same manner as
failure to testify in court? The courts have been reluctant to explore the rule
on this basis. At least three states, however, have decided the question. Two of
them, Alabama and Virginia, thought that pretrial questioning did not merit
constitutional protection. In Davis v. State,6 in which defendant was charged and
convicted of murder in the first degree, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that
silence in the face of an accusatory statement is admissible and its admission does
not violate the state constitution. The decision was based upon the questionable
reasoning that since defendant remained silent, he has not given any evidence
against himself. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reached the same decision by another route. In Owens v. Commonwealth,7 a case involving grand
larceny, the court concluded that the object of the protection is to prohibit the

1 The conviction was affirmed, one judge dissenting, but the judgment, insofar as it imposed a punishment for both grand theft and burglary where the offenses arose out of the same
ng, was reversed.
2 People v. Johnson, 215 Mich. 221, 183 N.W. 920 (1921); 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §§
152-53 (3d ed. 1940).
3 People v. Wells, 187 Cal. App. 2d 324, 9 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1961); People v. Citrino, 46
Cal. 2d 284, 294 P.2d 32 (1956).
4 People v. Citrino, 46 Cal. 2d 284, 294 P.2d 32 (1956).
5 Knight v. 'Commonwealth, 196 Va. 433, 83 S.E.2d 783 (1954).
6 131 Ala. 10, 31 So. 569 (1902).
7 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (1947).
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extraction "from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt."' As this does
not occur where a person remains silent, the self-incrimination clause was held not
to apply.
Opposite conclusions have been reached in Oklahoma and in the Fifth Circuit. In Ellis v. State,9 a manslaughter prosecution, the Oklahoma Criminal Court
of Appeals reversed a conviction and espoused the proposition that if a person's
silence while under arrest, in the face of accusatory statements should be admitted, "then the state would be able to do indirectly what the constitution expressly
provides it shall not do directly." 10 And in Helton v. United States," wherein
defendant was convicted of illegal acquisition and production of marijuana, the
Court of Appeals held that admission of defendant's silence was "in violation of
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fifth Amendment."' 2 As can be readily seen,
the Alabama and Virginia courts base their conclusions upon the form of testimony protected while the Oklahoma and Federal courts seem to rest their decisions upon the purpose of the protection, a foundation more in accord with
Anglo-American conceptions of justice. Although the cases are too sparse to indicate a definite majority viewpoint, in light of the almost universal use of the
rule it would appear that the great majority of states would not find the accusatory
statement rule constitutionally objectionable.
The California court, although not stating any reasons therefor, implies that
the self-incrimination privilege extends to police interrogations. After stating the
evidentiary rule in McFarland, the court continued: "His silence cannot be used
against him if it is based on a claim of right to which he is legally entitled."' 3
It is submitted that in reality this qualification, as a constitutional protection, adds
nothing to the accusatory statement rule. If a defendant makes known his claim
of right, the rule cannot be applied because the rationale supporting it has vanished.
Thus, it is a showing of a reason other than consciousness of guilt that destroys
the inference; it makes no difference whether defendant had a right to claim
the protection or not. However, if defendant remains absolutely silent, his claim
of privilege cannot possibly be recognized with any degree of certainty and this
is precisely the situation where the rule infers guilt.
Although the constitutional issue raised by the accusatory statement rule has
not been conclusively settled, the rule may be open to attack on its logic. As noted
earlier, it is founded on the assumption that the natural reaction of an innocent
person, accused of or implicated in crime, will be to deny such statements and
profess his innocence. Not all authorities agree on the validity of the assumption.
As a result, many jurisdictions further qualify the rule by making such evidence
inadmissible if the defendant refuses to answer while in the custody of the police
or under arrest.' 4 Courts which exclude the evidence point out that there are
motives other than consciousness of guilt that may cause an accused to remain
silent while under arrest.'5 A layman today, aware of the protection of the Fifth
Amendment, may mistakenly assume that while erroneous inferences may be
drawn from what he might say, surely he can be no worse off if he remains silent.
And further, arrest and police interrogation are occurrences so unfamiliar in his
daily routine, that fear and excitement may easily overcome his natural reactions.
Moreover, that people react differently when confronted by the same situation
8

9

Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1947).

36 Okla. 320, 128 Pac. 1095 (1912).

10 Ellis v. State, 36 Okla. 320, 321, 128 Pac. 1095, 1096 (1912).
11 221 F.2d 338 (1955).
12 Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341 (1955).
13 26 Cal. Rptr. at 477, 376 P.2d at 453.
14 Rickman v. State, 230 Ind. 262, 103 N.E.2d 207 (1952); People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y.
103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933). The courts seem to be evenly split on this point.
15 State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885 (1926) ; O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. 513, 113
N.W. 130 (1907); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 32 A.2d 889, 347 Pac. 486 (1943) (dissenting

opinion).
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is common knowledge. Yet under the accusatory statement rule, all people are
assumed to respond in but one "natural" manner. In ordinary cases it cannot be
denied that a protest on the part of the accused is the more probable reaction
if he is innocent. But to elevate a probability to the stature of evidence sufficient
to convict a person of crime is questionable criminal justice.
This rule may also have a deleterious effect on police administration beyond
that of facilitating convictions. It can be reasonably foreseen that the rule will
lead to the same evils as brought about by forced confessions, ie., reliance upon
the defendant's self-incrimination rather than effective police measures consonant
with humanitarian concepts. 16 Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of
California has recognized this problem. In People v. Atchley,'7 he said:
Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are untrustworthy,
because it offends the "community's sense of fair play and decency" to convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him, and because exclusion serves
to discourage the use of physical brutality and other undue pressures in questioning those suspected of crime.... All these reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply to involuntary admissions as well.us
It seems that the tacit admissions resulting from the accusatory statement rule
are just as untrustworthy, extorted, and involuntary as those condemned in the
Atchley case. Conceding a factual distinction, there is no apparent difference in
principle and it is submitted that the reasoning of Atchley is just as applicable to
the silence of McFarland.
There is one other aspect of the case which deserves consideration. While
California law provides that defendant's silence cannot be used against him if
based on a claim of right, the court recognized no such claim by defendant McFarland. However, it would not be unreasonable to interpret his statement that he
did not want to discuss the situation as such a claim. If the court is going to allow an
inference of guilt from any refusal to answer except on a claim of right, it would
seem fair to relax the requirements for invoking that claim. California has always
required a more explicit statement of the defendant's claim which this decision
seems to uphold.1 9
The McFarlandcase reaffirms and entrenches the accusatory statement rule and
its application. In view of its widespread acceptance, there is no indication of a
forthcoming change. Thus, in California, the paradox remains: Police officials
may, with judicial approbation, confront an accused with the statement that anything he says may be used against him, knowing full well that what he does not
say may similarly be employed in obtaining a conviction.
Donald Wintrode

16 Illustrations: Defendant's silence in the face of accusatory statements held inadmissible
where police officer slapped him and told him to keep his "damned mouth shut." People v.
Kozlowski, 368 Ill. 124, 13 N.E.2d 174 (1938). In People v. Young, 72 App. Div. 9, 76 N.Y.
Supp. 275 (1902), defendant's silence was held inadmissible where before reading a codefendant's statement, police officer told defendant that he did not expect him to say anything,
that anything he said might be used against him, and that the only reason the officer was reading the statement was to inform him of the evidence against him.
17 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959).
18 People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 171, 346 P.2d 764, 769 (1959).
19 In People v. Collins, 4 Cal. App. 2d 86, 40 P.2d 542 (1935), defendant, upon being confronted with an accusation of committing abortion, declared that he had nothing to say. Held:
His silence and conduct were sufficient corroboration.
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WRONGFUL DEATH -

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN DENIED RECOVERY.

Alberta Frazier instituted an action under the survival and wrongful death
statutes for the recovery of damages resulting from the death of Claude Frazier.
Mary Jane Frazier, appellant, as mother and natural guardian of Toni and
Claudette Frazier, petitioned the court to intervene in -that action, alleging that
Toni and Claudette were entitled to share in any damages recovered for the
death of their father in spite of the fact that they were his illegitimate children.
From an order refusing the intervention, these appeals were taken and it was
held: affirmed. The right to share in the recovery of damages under the survival
statute must await the actual recovery of such damages by the estate;' and in the
absence of any qualifying expression, the word "children" in the wrongful death
statute means legitimate children. Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 179
A.2d 202 (1962).
In 1851, Pennsylvania enacted a wrongful death statute which provided that:
"Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no
suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the
widow . . . , or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may main-

tain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."12 Four

years later, an amendment to this act provided that "The persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing death shall be the husband, widow, children,
or parents of the deceased, and no other relatives; . . . and the sum recovered

shall go to them in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in
case of intestacy. .

. ."s

This amendment was passed on April 26, 1855, at a time

when an illegitimate child had no right of inheritance. The very next day, April
27, the legislature passed an act which gave to illegitimate children and their
mother the right to inherit from each other,4 which act was amended in 1947 to
provide that "For the purposes of descent by, from and through an illegitimate, he
shall be considered the child of his mother, but not of his father."5 (Emphasis
supplied.) The fact that Toni and Claudette were not "children" within the
meaning of the wrongful death act was itself a fatal blow. The intestacy act was
but a coup de grace.
In State ex rel. Smith v. Hagerstown & Frederick Ry.,6 where a mother was
suing for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, it was said:
Courts may very well sympathize with a woman who finds herself in the
position that Mrs. Smith does in the present case, but that can afford no
justification for departing from long and well-established rules of law and
construction, and the relief, if any, in such cases is to be sought from the
Legislature and not from the courts.

That decision, like the one in the present case, was the product of common law
doctrine and a lengthy history of statutory interpretation.
At common law, an illegitimate was an outcast. Conceived in the sin of his
parents, he entered a world which called him "bastard." The law regarded him
as "filius nullius," the child of no one: "[H]e cannot be heir to anyone, neither
can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius, he is therefore
of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be
derived." 7 Various explanations have been advanced for the origin of the rule.
One court stated that it arose in order to prevent illicit sexual relations.8 If this
1 The prematurity of appellant's petition to intervene in the survival action will not
be discussed.
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit12, § 1601 (1953).
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
4 PA. LAWS 1855, p. 368, No. 387, § 3.
5
6
7
8

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7 (1953).

130 Md. 78, 114 AUt. 729, 730 (1921).
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459.
Clarke v. The Carfin Coal Co., 1891] A. C. 412, 427 (Scot.).
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was its purpose, it has had little success." Considering the fact that the doctrine
applied only to inheritance, 10 it would appear that necessity is a better explanation.
In an age which lacked even the limited scientific and medical assistance of today,
paternity was almost impossible to prove. "[S]ince it [was] necessary that the heir
should be one whose right could be ascertained, therefore marriage, an act capable
of proof, could be relied upon as determining the heir."' "
Like many other doctrines of the common law, the disability of the illegitimate
child was almost universally accepted by the American States. 1 2 Because of the
bastard's want of inheritable blood, the words "child," "children," and "heirs"
in statutes relating to descent and distribution (and to a great extent, workmen's
compensation acts' s ) are interpreted as meaning lawful children only.'4 When a
survival or wrongful death statute enumerates the beneficiaries to whom a right
of action accrues, it applies only to legitimate beneficiaries. By "children" is meant
legitimate or legitimatized children.' 5 Hence, a bastard is generally unable to bring
an action for the death of his mother 6 or father.'7 Conversely, a mother' or
father' 9 is generally unable to recover for the death of an illegitimate child.
With respect to modem inheritance law, the disability of an illegitimate to
bring an action for the death of his mother and the disability of a mother to bring
an action for the death of her illegitimate child have disappeared. The vast majority of the states have enacted statutes enabling an illegitimate to inherit from
his mother or legitimizing a bastard in regard to his mother.2 0 In some of these
9

The number of illegitimate births in the United States has more than doubled since

1938. There were an estimated 208,700 illegitimate births in the United States in 1958.
Legislative Research Commission, Commw. of Ky., ILLEGITIMACY IN KENTUCKY, Research

Report No. 4 (1961).
10 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES *214.

11 16 HARV. L. Rnv. 22, 23 (1902).
12 Although many jurisdictions modified the doctrine by statute, Connecticut refused to
accept it. Heath et ux. v. White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824).
13 An action for death under a wrongful death act must be distinguished from an action
for death under a workmen's compensation act, where: "Generally speaking the lawmakers

and courts have protected illegitimate children, especially when acknowledged. In the
absence of specific statutory rules, courts have protected illegitimate children, especially
when acknowledged, either by classifying them as 'members of the family' or as 'children.'"
RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION

324 (1950).

14 Supra, note 11.
15 Adams v. Powell, 67 Ga. App. 460, 21 S.E.2d 111 (1942); Cheeks v. The Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of New York, 87 So.2d 377 (La. App. 1956); McDonald v. So. Ry., 171
S.C. 352, 51 S.E. 138 (1905).
16 Cheeks v. The Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, supra note 15; Adams v. Powell,
supra note 15.

17 Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952). With the exception of
Arizona and Oregon which treat every child as legitimate, Ariz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206(a)
(1956); OREGON REV. STAT. §§ 111.231, 109.060 (1947), there seems to be no jurisdiction
which permits an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of his father. In a recent Maryland case, however, the court hinted that under certain circumstances it might

permit an illegitimate child to recover. The court said:
It will be noted that we are dealing with a situation where the decedent's
mother is still living. We are not called upon to decide, and therefore express no opinion upon, whether an illegitimate child of a deceased father

could qualify under Section 4 as "any person related to the deceased by
blood or marriage" who is wholly dependent upon the deceased when he has
no wife, parent, or legitimate child. State v. Try, 220 Md. 270, 152 A.2d
126, 128 (1959).
18 State ex rel. Smith v. Hagerstown & Frederick Ry., 139 Md. 78, 114 At. 729 (1921).
19 McDonald v. Pit., C., C. & St. L. Ry., 144 Ind. 459, 43 N.E. 447 (1896).
20 Forty-nine of the fifty-one American jurisdictions permit an illegitimate child to
be an heir of his mother in the same manner as if he were legitimate. Typical of these
statutes is that of Ohio: "Bastards shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance
from and to the mother, and from and to those from whom she may inherit or to whom she
may transmit inheritance, as if born in lawful wedlock." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.17
(Page 1953). In Heath et ux. v. White, supra, note 13, Connecticut by judicial interpretation of the word "child" permitted an illegitimate to inherit from his mother. The two re-
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states, a mother may maintain an action for the death of
her illegitimate child,"'
and the illegitimate child for the death of his mother.2" The courts permitting
recovery -do so on the theory that the statutes supply the inheritable blood that
was lacking under the common law. Instead of being the child of no one, the
illegitimate has a mother from whom he can inherit and to whom he can transmit
property. 23 Such statutes have been strictly construed and do not affect the right
of recovery between the illegitimate and his father. 24
In a number of cases, statutory interpretation has led to painful extremes.
In 1883 a Vermont court held that the word "dependent" does not include an
illegitimate child.25 In Beaver v. State,26 the court interpreted a statute which provided for the punishment ". . of any parent who shall wilfully . . . neglect or
refuse to provide for the support . . . of his or her child . . .,,
as meaning

legitimate child, with the result that a father did not have to support his illegitimate
child.
Although the plight of the illegitimate remains anything but an enviable one,
some courts have awakened to the fact that the illegitimate is a human being.
Too often, however, this enlightenment is no more than an expression of sympathy. In Reilley v. Shapiro while denying recovery the court conceded:
Nor can it be denied that a child born out of wedlock is as much in need
of parental aid and the natural rights that go with the relationship of
parent and child as those pertaining to a child born in wedlock. Every
human instinct is moved toward extending a helping hand to such child,
already laboring under a handicap impossible of removal.28

Small consolation, this moral victory.
A more substantial victory for the cause of the illegitimate is found in Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.2 9 which involved the claim of an illegitimate under
the Federal Death Act,30 wherein the court stated: "The rule that a bastard is
nullius filius applies only in cases of inheritance . . . The purpose and object of
the statute is to continue the support of dependents after a casualty. To hold that
these children or their parents do not come within the terms of the statute would
be to defeat the purposes of the act." 3'
Subjecting wrongful death acts to the analysis of the Luckenback case, it would
appear that an illegitimate should have every right that his halfbrothers and halfsisters enjoy.
Every American state now has a statutory remedy for wrongful death.
Most of the statutes were modeled upon Lord Campbell's Act, which is a
"death act," and creates a new cause of action for the death in favor of
the decedent's
personal representative for the benefit of certain designated
3 2

persons.

Under Lord Campbell's Act and the great majority of the death acts
maining states, Louisiana and New York, do not prohibit inheritance by the illegitimate from

his mother, but permit it only when the mother is not survived by lawful issue. In addition,
Louisiana demands that the mother acknowledge that the child is hers. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAw § 83(13); LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 918-923.

21 Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914); L. T. Dickason Coal
Co. v. Liddil, 49 Ind. App. 40, 94 N.E. 411 (1911); Marshall v. Wabash R.R., 120 Mo.

275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894).

22 Marshall v. Wabash R.R., 120 Mo. 275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894); Bonewit v. Weber,
95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952).
23 Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914).
24 Brindey v. Dixie Constr. Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267 (1949); Dilworth v. Tisdale
Transfer & Storage Co., 209 Tenn. 449, 354 S.W.2d 261 (1962).
25 Good v. Towns, 56 Vt. 410, 48 Am. Rep. 799 (1883).
26 256 S.W. 929 (Tex. Cr. App. 1923).
27 Tax. LAws 1913, p. 188, ch. 101"§ 1.
28 196 Minn. 376, 265 N.W. 284, 286 (1936).
29 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934).
30 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
31 Middleton v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934).
32 PROSSER, TORTS 710 (2d ed. 1955).
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the action proceeds on the theory of compensating the individual beneficiary for loss of the economic benefit which they might reasonably have
expected to receive from the decedent in the form of support, services,
or contributions during the remainder of his lifetime if he had not been
killed. 3 3

This rationale, however, cannot be extended to survival actions, where "[T]he
action is on behalf of the decedent's estate, and the damages . . . include not
only the pain and suffering of the decedent during his lifetime, but further compensation to the estate itself for loss of prospective economic benefit in the form
of future earnings or savings." 34
An argument that the common law limitation upon the rights of illegitimate
children should never have been "read into" the wrongful death statutes seldom
provides assistance to the unfortunate claimant, for the foundation of the present
status of the law was laid many years ago, and the building blocks of subsequent
decisions have formed a mighty fortress of precedent so strong as to be almost impregnable.3s5 A better argument is one that is grounded upon the inheritable relationship which forty-nine3 6 jurisdictions now hold to exist between the illegitimate
and his mother. With this injection of inheritable blood into the veins of the illegitimate, little reason remains for denying recovery for the tortious death of an
illegitimate mother or child.
Although the illegitimate may have justified optimism for recovery in an action
for the wrongful death of his mother, he has less hope in an action for the wrongful
death of his father. Whereas forty-nine jurisdictions recognize the existence of an
inheritable relationship between the illegitimate and his mother, only twenty recognize a similar relationship between the illegitimate and his father, 37 and these
do so only when the father acknowledges 8 the child to be his. Even after being
acknowledged the law is still discriminatory, for the illegitimate is generally unable
to inherit from his father's kin. 9 Hence there is little hope for recovery in an action
for the death of such kin.
Although statutory extension of the rights of illegitimates will continue to be
slow in enactment and may never completely emancipate the illegitimate, justice
would seem to dictate a policy of nondiscrimination - a complete elimination of
all remaining vestiges of the common law doctrine of nullius filius. In an action
under a wrongful death statute, where the action proceeds on the theory of compensating the enumerated beneficiaries for their actual loss, the only result of denying
an illegitimate recovery for the death of his father is a partial immunization of
the tortfeasor from liability for damages which he has caused. Where the action for
the death of a father is under a survival statute and the measure of damages is
the loss suffered by the estate, justice would seem to demand that the illegitimate
33 Id. at 713.
34 Ibid.

35 E.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Hagerstown & Frederick Ry., 130 Md. 78, 114 At.
(1921).

36

129

Supra, note 20.

37 Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. A representative statute of these states is that
of Florida which states that: "Every illegitimate child is the heir of his mother, and also of
the person who, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges
himself to be the father. . . . However, such illegitimate child does not represent his father
or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of the parents' kindred. . . ." FLA.
STAT.
ANN. § 731.29 (1961). In 26 BROOxLYN L. REv. 45, 76-79 (1960) there is a comprehensive
comparison of the inheritance rights of the illegitimate in the fifty-one jurisdictions.
38 A typical act of acknowledgment is the recognition in writing, signed in the presence
of a competent witness, that one acknowledges himself to be the father of the child.
39 A majority of the states which permit an illegitimate to inherit from his father after
acknowledgment specifically provide that the child may not inherit from his father's kin.
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (1961).
40 Supra, note 20.
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be entitled to share in the estate - that he should be able to inherit from his
father. Indeed, there seems to be no justifiable reason for denying the illegitimate
all the rights that his legitimate brothers and sisters enjoy. A number of states
apparently agree.4 An examination of these statutes conveys the impression that
only the fear of fraudulent claims prevents the complete emancipation of the illegitimate. But more to be feared than the possibilit of fraudulent claims is the
impossibility of justice. Here lies the greatest evil. Although much has been done to
alleviate the plight of the illegitimate, "in a society which has barbarically handicapped and burdened children of illegithinate parents for sins in the commission of
which they had no part, much remains to be done to humanize existing rules of
law'."'
Robert B. Cash

41

Jung v. Saint Paul Fire Dep't Relief, 223 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d 152, 155 (194,7).
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